This rejection marks an unexpected geopolitical setback recently inflicted on China by the island nations of the South Pacific. Indeed, in a context where the Indo-Pacific has become a new arena of rivalry between China and the United States, Beijing seeks to bring the South Pacific island nations into its security orbit. To this end, it has embarked on a bold security cooperation diplomacy with the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Niue, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, and Timor-Leste. The aim of this diplomacy is primarily to conclude defense and security agreements, and secondarily economic ones, through seabed mapping and the exploitation of natural resources.
However, among the leaders of Micronesia, China’s diplomatic approach is perceived as an attempt by Beijing to replace the prevailing bilateralism in the South Pacific with a multilateralism favorable to Chinese interests. This has prompted Micronesia’s call for vigilance, and it seems to have already chosen the side of the United States by signing an agreement in 2021 allowing Washington to establish a military base on its territory. In this context, it is plausible to suspect tacit American interference in the Pacific leaders’ refusal to join China’s “common development vision,” citing a lack of regional consensus.
For China, such resistance does not indicate a weakness in its diplomacy or a decline in its position in the region. In reality, it seeks to downplay this rejection by emphasizing cooperation based on agriculture, climate change, and poverty reduction. According to Chinese authorities, this diplomatic orientation in the region may serve as a pretext for future security agreements. To this end, Beijing has published a “position paper” on its relations with the South Pacific, outlining a 15-point “vision” and 24 concrete commitments, none of which directly concern the security sector.
These circumventions of China’s security diplomacy in the South Pacific are not viewed favorably by Australia, a major local ally of the United States in the region. For Australia, the potential use of the South Pacific island nations to project Chinese power represents a geopolitical and geostrategic disaster for the evolution of Australian security. Simply put, the rise of Chinese influence in the region would create a very uncomfortable situation for the Americans and their allies with regard to their security and strategic interests. Canberra is therefore deeply concerned about having its borders come closer to those of China from a military standpoint.
Seeing China as a strategic rival, Australia struggles to counter Chinese ambitions in the South Pacific. It faces major limitations in its regional positioning due to its weak development support for some island nations compared to China, which provides loans for infrastructure projects, large-scale construction, and financial incentives to political elites. To counter this rise in Chinese influence, Australia aims to restore its presence in the region by committing approximately $400 million to these island nations; facilitating visa access; supporting the fight against illegal fishing; and engaging firmly in the battle against climate change, seen as an existential threat to these island countries. Overall, the goal of Washington and its allies in the South Pacific is to counter China’s economic ambitions in the region.