A military partnership is being forged between the Malian government under Prime Minister Choguel Maïga and the Russian private military company "Wagner." This initiative arises in a context where France is redeploying its forces in the Sahel, a situation that displeases Mali’s main foreign military partner, France. Indeed, France opposes this initiative by the Malian authorities for the following reasons:

• The controversial perception of the Russian private military company "Wagner" as a covert army of the Kremlin

• The security incompatibility between "Wagner" (viewed as Russian paramilitaries or mercenaries) and Western support to Mali

• The tensions between this Russian private military company and France in the Central African Republic

The end of the French "Barkhane" operation in favor of setting up a still embryonic international coalition upset the Malian authorities, who felt sidelined and thus opened security options or partnerships that could make them more autonomous in defending and securing their country. France, for its part, justifies its redeployment by arguing that the reduction in its troop numbers (down to 5,100 soldiers by 2023) represents a transformation of its security posture rather than an abandonment of its strategic and operational priorities in Mali and the Sahel region in general.

Although the Malian authorities (Choguel Maïga) and Russian officials (Sergey Lavrov, head of Russian diplomacy) seem to implicitly agree on such a partnership, France remains determined to prevent this initiative from materializing.

While France aims to preserve its sphere of influence and interests in Mali, the Malian authorities seek to leverage international rivalries to demand stronger and more extensive engagement from their Western partners by pressuring them with Moscow’s support. This stance is tied to the recurring nationalist discourse in Mali and a clear desire to change defense and security strategy since 2020. The tendency toward shifting security cooperation toward Russia is also explained by the professional background of key political figures behind this initiative—particularly Prime Minister Choguel Maïga, a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Telecommunications, and Defense Minister Sadio Camara, trained in Russia.

The slow but steady deterioration of relations between the current Malian authorities and France stems from three factors:

• The Malian authorities’ loss of trust in France, viewed as ineffective in the fight against terrorism

• The non-implementation of the peace agreement between the current Malian authorities and former northern rebels

• The slow redeployment of state authority for effective territorial control

These divergences are concerning, as similar trends are observed with neighboring Sahel countries such as Niger. The current Malian authorities complain about the lack of noticeable improvements in security and stability, often citing the southward spread of the jihadist threat and the multiplication of internal intercommunal conflicts as evidence.