Since Saturday, April 15, hundreds of civilians have lost their lives in violent clashes between the army, loyal to General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane—who has been in power since the October 2021 coup—and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdane Daglo, known as "Hemedti." It is important to note that during the October 2021 coup, Hemedti and General Burhane had united to remove civilians from power.

This worst-case scenario was feared by the international community and many Sudanese, as relations between the two strongmen of the regime have deteriorated in recent months amid power struggles and rivalries over the control of resources. But the tipping point appears to have been a reform of the security apparatus, which planned to integrate the RSF into the regular army as part of the transition agreement toward democracy. The feared leader of the RSF is determined to keep "his army" independent, serving his interests and political ambitions. After having ousted civilians from power alongside General Burhane, "Hemedti" may now seek to dislodge the army that has ruled the country since independence. "Hemedti wants to completely free himself from the military institution and from the tutelage of the army’s strongman, General Burhane, who harbors presidential ambitions," said Hasni Abidi, director of the Center for Studies on the Arab World (Cermam), on France 24. Unsurprisingly, the army chief has decreed the dissolution of the RSF, now considered rebels.

This crisis brings back to the forefront the issue of the privatization of security in Africa. Indeed, faced with the fragility of African states’ defense systems, the use of private actors seems to be increasing on the continent despite the lack of a true framework to guarantee the allegiance of these forces. The Sudanese crisis thus challenges African leaders to mature the opportunistic alliances they make for selfish reasons to maintain their power.